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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
indemnified party.30 The respective clauses in Levine and Redding are
semantically distinct but not substantively different. It is puzzling that
the Redding court recognized "that the words 'any and all' were suffi-
cient to cover the owner's active negligence"3 1 in Levine, but found
them insufficient in the instant case. Since Levine indicated that no
further evidence is required to establish the requisite intent under these
circumstances, the court should have decided in favor of Gulf on this
point.32
AtTlcrL 22- STAY, MOTIONS, ORDERS AND MANDATES
CPLR 2219(a): Case illustrates the futility of seeking to compel a judge
to render a decision.
CPLR 2219(a) provides that an order determining a motion shall
be made within sixty days. Should a court fail to comply with this rule,
any party to the action can commence an article 78 proceeding to compel
the judge to file a decision. The practical outcome of this proceeding,
however, leaves much to be desired.
In October 1970, a proceeding was commenced in family court to
terminate a mother's parental rights in her daughter. The mother
moved to dismiss the case, and the judge reserved his decision. When,
after six months, no decision was forthcoming, the mother initiated an
article 78 proceeding to compel him to render a decision. In Roth-
man v. Thurston, 3 the Supreme Court, New York County, granted
the petition. It noted that the respondent's delay was inexcusable and
far in excess of the 60-day time limit of CPLR 2219(a).3 4 In light of the
fact that an infant's welfare was at stake, prompt disposition was deemed
necessary. Therefore, the court ordered the respondent to decide the
case within 10 days. If the respondent continued to withhold a decision
30 28 N.Y.2d at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.YS.2d at 86.
31 67 Misc. 2d at 466, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
32 The Redding court stated:
No more is submitted in support of Gulf's position than an affidavit of an attorney
who points to the clause and submits a memorandum of law devoted to a discus-
sion of the opinion in Levine. There has not been offered an affidavit of an officer,
agent, employee, etc. of the Company with knowledge of the facts which would
demonstrate the intention to indemnify against injury to the lessee.
Id. at 467, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
However, Levine indicated that further evidence need not be proffered. 28 N.Y.2d at
212, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
33 67 Misc. 2d 543, 324 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
34 The 60-day time limit has been held to be merely directory and not mandatory.
Kaminsky v. Abrams, 51 Misc. 2d 5, 272 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). See 2A
WK&M 1 2219.01, which also points out that "no sanction is imposed under this rule for
failure of the judge to decide the motion within the specified time."
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beyond the 10-day limit, a mistrial would be declared and a rehearing
ordered.35
The futility of an article 78 proceeding to order a judge to comply
with GPLR 2219(a) is apparent. Presently, the most effective pressure
upon a judge comes from an administrative board ruling which requires
him to submit a statement "indicating the matters which have been
pending undecided before him for a period of 60 days after final sub-
mission and the reasons therefor."36 It seems that some sanction, in ad-
dition to the scrutiny of his superiors, should be available against a
recalcitrant judge.
ARcicrm 32 - Acc=mRATE JuDoiENT
Collateral Estoppel: Thoughts on mass tort cases and the "multiple
plaintiff anomaly."
An adjudication of certain questions actually litigated and deter-
mined in a civil action may be binding in subsequent litigation under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel 37 Until recently the principle of
mutuality of estoppel precluded a party not bound by a prior judgment
from benefitting from that judgment by pleading it in a subsequent
action.38 The premise upon which mutuality of estoppel was based con-
cerned an apprehension that unjust results could occur if the benefit of
collateral estoppel were extended to persons not parties to the original
action.30 However, some exceptions to the mutuality rule developed as
35 Professor McLaughlin stated: "If a party wishes to insist upon literal compliance
with the sixty-day rule he must call this to the court's attention before the period expires."
He does not indicate, however, what effective measure, if any, can be taken should the
judge nevertheless delay beyond th sixty days. 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 2219, supp. commen-
tary at 20 (1967).
-6 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 20.2.
27 Collateral estoppel must be distinguished from the principle of total res judicata,
which prevents a party from relitigating the same cause of action against his opponent
following a final judgment rendered on that cause of action. Collateral estoppel renders a
final judgment conclusive as to issues necessarily decided in the determination of an
action before a competent court. RrrATE ENT OF JUDGMENTs § 68, comment a, at 294 (1942).
In order for an adjudication to be binding in subsequent litigation, the issue presented in
the prior action must be identical to that raised in the subsequent suit and the issue pre-
sented must have been actually litigated. In addition, it must have been essential to the
prior determination and ultimate in both suits. See Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in
New York, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 165 (1969) [hereinafter Rosenberg].
38 See Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1938);
Atlantic Dock Co. v. Mayor, Alderman & Commonalty of City of New York, 53 N.Y. 64
(1873). See generally 2 BLACK, JuDGmrrs § 548 (2d ed. 1902).
39 See Moore & Currie, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TrL. L. R .
301 (1961); Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor Privies-
Two California Cases, 57 HAav. L. REv. 98 (1943); von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YAr-E
LJ. 299 (1929).
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